This paper proposes a framework for studying how consumer search frictions a¤ect retail market structure. In our model single-product …rms which supply different products can merge to form a multiproduct …rm. Consumers wish to buy multiple products and value the one-stop shopping convenience associated with a multiproduct …rm. We …nd that when the search friction is relatively large all …rms are multiproduct in equilibrium. However when the search friction is smaller the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric, with single-product and multiproduct …rms coexisting. This asymmetric market structure often leads to the weakest price competition, and is the worst for consumers among all possible market structures. Due to the endogeneity of market structure, a reduction in the search friction can increase market prices and decrease consumer welfare.
Introduction
Many consumers place a high value on one-stop shopping convenience. They are often time-constrained, and so value the opportunity to buy a large basket of products in one place.
1 Consequently product assortment is an important dimension along which retailers compete. Over time there has been a steady increase in the size of retail assortments. The Food Marketing Institute estimates that between 1975 and 2013, the number of products in an average US supermarket increased from around 9,000 to almost 44,000. At least part of this increase can be attributed to retailers stocking new product categories. 2 For example Wal-Mart has expanded into pharmacies and clinical services, whilst drugstores like Walgreens and CVS have started selling fresh food and grocery items. Nevertheless one striking feature of most retail markets is their persistent heterogeneity -large retailers like Wal-Mart or Amazon often coexist alongside many specialist retailers with much narrower product selections.
3
There is little formal research on how demand-side economies of scope, such as one-stop shopping convenience, might shape the retail market structure. This is partly because multiproduct competition is complicated to analyze in environments where consumers demand multiple products and value one-stop shopping convenience. This paper provides a tractable consumer search framework to investigate this issue. We …nd that the magnitude of consumer search frictions determines whether the equilibrium market structure is symmetric with all multiproduct …rms, or is asymmetric with a mix of single-product and multiproduct …rms. We also examine the welfare properties of di¤erent market structures, and show that a move towards larger retail assortments is not necessarily bene…cial for consumers. In the same vein we show that once endogeneity of market structure is accounted for, a reduction in search frictions (due, for example, to a shift from traditional to online retailing) does not necessarily increase consumer welfare.
Our model starts with a situation where there are two products (or product categories)
1 Nowadays many consumers buy groceries from big box stores such as Wal-Mart and Target, instead of more traditional grocery stores. For example, a survey by King Retail Solutions shows that 77% of consumers bought groceries from a non-traditional grocery store in 2013 (see http://www.kingrs.com/news/…lter/white-paper/study-traditional-retail-categories-are-blurring). Seo (2015) estimates that the value of one-stop shopping convenience from grocery stores being able to sell liquor is about $2.52 per trip, or 8% of an average household's expenditure on liquor.
2 Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) provide empirical evidence that time-saving convenience is the most important driver of this growth in supermarket store size. (Another important reason is the adoption of modern distribution technology in the 1980s and 1990s.) 3 Indeed anecdotally online markets appear even less symmetric than o-ine ones e.g. in 2012 Amazon sold more than its top 12 online competitors combined.
and each of them is sold by two single-product …rms. Each pair of single-product …rms which supply di¤erent products then choose whether to merge and form a multiproduct …rm. This generates one of three possible market structures: either four single-product …rms, or two multiproduct …rms, or an asymmetric market with one multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms. Consumers di¤er with respect to their search technology. Some consumers ("shoppers") are able to visit all …rms without incurring any cost and so buy each product at the lowest price available. Other consumers ("non-shoppers") are time-constrained and are only able to visit one (single-product or multiproduct) …rm. It is these non-shoppers who value the one-stop shopping convenience provided by a multiproduct …rm. The fraction of non-shoppers is interpreted as a measure of the search friction in the market. We show that a merger has two distinct e¤ects. Firstly, when two single-product …rms which supply di¤erent products merge, they provide one-stop shopping convenience and so are searched by more non-shoppers (a "search e¤ect"). Secondly though, the merger also changes market structure and in ‡uences price competition (a "price competition e¤ect"). We show that when the …rst pair of single-product …rms merge, this leads to an asymmetric market structure and softens price competition. This is because the resulting multiproduct …rm focuses more on exploiting its one-stop shopping convenience through higher prices, which further relaxes competition with the remaining two single-product …rms. (In fact, all …rms in our model bene…t from this …rst merger.) Consequently the price competition e¤ect works in the same direction as the search e¤ect, and so there is no equilibrium with four single-product …rms. More interestingly, the size of the search friction determines whether or not a second merger occurs. When the second pair of single-product …rms merge, they win back some non-shoppers, but the resulting market structure with two multiproduct …rms also intensi…es price competition relative to the asymmetric case. In other words, the price competition e¤ect now works against the search e¤ect. The price competition e¤ect dominates -and so the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric -if and only if the search friction is relatively low. Thus our model is able to generate both symmetric and asymmetric market structures, depending upon the size of consumer search frictions in the market.
By comparing the three possible market structures, we …nd that the asymmetric market structure is the worst for consumers and often the best for industry pro…t. This …nding has two implications. First, it indicates that a merger between two …rms which supply di¤erent products can harm consumers, even if it does not reduce the number of competitors in each product market. In antitrust parlance this is called a "conglomerate merger". 4 Our model suggests that if there are search frictions on the demand side, a conglomerate merger can be anti-competitive. (We discuss this point further in the related literature section, below.) Second, our result also suggests that reducing search frictions does not necessarily harm …rms and bene…t consumers. This is because when the search friction becomes smaller, the market structure can switch from a symmetric one with all big …rms to an asymmetric one with both big and small …rms. This indirect e¤ect on market structure can work against and even dominate the direct e¤ect of reducing search frictions on …rms and consumers. Therefore our study suggests that a welfare assessment of a change in search frictions (e.g. due to a move towards online retailing) should take into account its impact on market structure. These main insights continue to hold in two extensions which are (i) allowing nonshoppers to be able to visit more than one …rm by paying a search cost, and (ii) considering more than two pairs of …rms. We also consider two alternative models: one with a nonmerger framework where …rms can choose their product ranges directly, and the other where …rms sell di¤erentiated products and consumers engage in sequential search. The main result that an asymmetric market structure arises in equilibrium when the search friction is relatively small remains true in all these variants of the model.
Related literature: Our benchmark search model with homogeneous products builds on Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983) which introduce di¤erentially informed consumers, whilst our alternative search model with di¤erentiated products builds on Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) . (These are the two most common approaches to avoid the Diamond, 1971 paradox.) These papers only study single-product search. We extend them to the multiproduct case where consumers need and …rms (may) supply multiple products.
There is a growing literature on multiproduct consumer search. Lal and Matutes (1994) show that multiproduct search can lead to loss-leader pricing when some products are advertised. McAfee (1995) and Shelegia (2012) examine when and how multiproduct …rms correlate their prices across products when consumers are heterogeneously informed.
5 Zhou (2014) investigates how multiproduct search generates a joint search ef-4 There are two types of conglomerate merger. One involves …rms producing totally unrelated products e.g. steel and tissues. The other involves …rms producing complementary products, or products which belong to a range of products that are generally purchased by the same set of consumers. (See for example the EU guidelines on non-horizontal mergers.) The merger discussed in our paper is of the second type. 5 See also Baughman and Burdett (2015) and Kaplan et al. (2015) for more recent work in this direction. The former shows that assuming no consumer recall can greatly simplify the analysis of multiproduct search with price dispersion. The latter o¤ers a search model with high and low valuation consumers which can explain relative price dispersion across retailers.
fect, which creates complementarity between physically independent products, and leads to lower prices compared to the case with single-product search. Rhodes (2015) studies the relationship between the size of a retailer's product range, its pricing, and its advertising decision. He shows that a multiproduct retailer's low advertised prices can signal low prices on its unadvertised products. However all these papers assume an exogenously given market structure where each …rm sells the same range of products. We depart from this literature by endogenizing market structure, and show that an asymmetric market structure can emerge as an equilibrium outcome. There is also research on multiproduct …rms and endogenous market structure when consumers have perfect information about …rm o¤erings. Typically these papers consider a duopoly model where each …rm can choose which varieties of a product to supply. The varieties are either horizontally di¤erentiated (e.g. Shaked and Sutton, 1990) , or vertically di¤erentiated (e.g. Champsaur and Rochet, 1989) , or both (e.g. Gilbert and Matutes, 1993) . However in these papers there is no notion of one-stop shopping convenience, and moreover an asymmetric market with both large and small …rms does not usually arise in equilibrium. (See Manez and Waterson, 2001 for a survey of this literature.) There are also papers on multiproduct competition which introduce shopping frictions whilst maintaining the assumption of perfectly informed consumers. However they assume either an exogenous symmetric market where two …rms supply the same range of products (e.g. Lal and Matutes, 1989 , Klemperer, 1992 , and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010 , or an exogenous asymmetric market where one big …rm coexists with a competitive fringe of small …rms with a narrower product range (see Chen and Rey, 2012). 6 Our paper is also related to the literature on bundling and market structure. Another potential advantage of forming a multiproduct …rm is the ability to use more advanced pricing strategies such as bundling. However if all single-product …rms merge and form multiproduct …rms, the resulting bundle-against-bundle competition is often …erce and harms all …rms. As a result an asymmetric market structure can arise in equilibrium. Nalebu¤ (2000) and Thanassoulis (2011) make this point in di¤erent settings with product di¤erentiation. We argue that even if multiproduct …rms do not use bundling (e.g. in many retail markets such as the grocery industry we do not observe store-wide bundling), the existence of search frictions can still favor a multiproduct …rm and generate an asymmetric market structure. Our model also predicts that a symmetric market with all big …rms can arise in equilibrium, which is not the case in the above two papers. 6 See also Johnson (2014) for a multiproduct competition model where the market friction is that consumers are boundedly rational and make unplanned purchases. Section 3 of his paper considers an asymmetric market where one …rm is exogenously able to carry more products than another.
Also related is the literature on agglomeration. Baumol and Ide (1956) argue that larger retailers may attract more demand, because consumers are more willing to incur the time and transportation costs necessary to visit them. Stahl (1982) shows that due to a similar demand expansion e¤ect, single-product …rms have an incentive to co-locate (e.g. in a shopping mall) provided their products are not too substitutable. In a search environment …rms may locate near each other either to o¤er consumers a higher chance of a good product match (Wolinsky, 1983) , or as a way of guaranteeing consumers that they will face low prices (Dudey, 1990 and Non, 2010) . Moraga-González and Petrikait· e (2013) show that when a subset of …rms with di¤erentiated versions of a product merge and sell all their products in a single shop, they become prominent and are searched …rst by consumers. However in all these papers consumers buy only one product, and so any one-stop shopping convenience does not arise from consumers'need to buy multiple products. Nevertheless this is an important feature of many retail markets.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on conglomerate mergers. Since conglomerate mergers do not eliminate competitors and may generate cost synergies, economists and policymakers (especially in the US) often hold a benign view (see Church, 2008 for a survey). However our model shows that conglomerate mergers (which involve …rms producing products needed by the same set of consumers) have a potential anticompetitive e¤ect. In independent and concurrent work, Chen and Rey (2015) examine conglomerate merger using a di¤erent framework. They …nd that conglomerate merger can also soften price competition, but that it bene…ts consumers (at least when bundling is infeasible). In addition, due to their modelling assumptions a second conglomerate merger is never pro…table because it leads to Bertrand competition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a benchmark model, characterizes price distributions in various market structures, and solves for the equilibrium market structure. Section 3 considers various extensions and shows the robustness of the main results from the benchmark model, and Section 4 concludes. All omitted proofs are available in the appendix.
A Benchmark Model
A unit mass of consumers is interested in buying two products 1 and 2. Each consumer has unit demand, and is willing to pay up to v for each product. 7 Initially there are four single-product …rms in the market: two of them, denoted by 1 A and 1 B , sell a homogenous 7 The analysis can be extended to allow for elastic demand without changing the main result. The details are available upon request.
product 1, and the other two, denoted by 2 A and 2 B , sell a homogenous product 2. The marginal cost of supplying each product is normalized to zero. As we describe in more detail below, it is too costly for some consumers to visit multiple …rms, and so they would bene…t from the emergence of multiproduct …rms which supply both products. We consider a two-stage game. In the …rst stage, each pair of …rms (1 k ,2 k ), k = A; B, which supply di¤erent products, has the opportunity to merge and form a multiproduct …rm.
8 Their merger decisions can be simultaneous (in which case we focus on pure strategy equilibria) or sequential. We assume that merger is costless and does not a¤ect the marginal cost of supplying each product. 9 In the second stage, after observing the market structure …rms simultaneously choose their prices and consumers search and make their purchases. We assume that multiproduct …rms do not use bundling and charge separate prices for each product.
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Consumers di¤er with respect to their search technology. A fraction 2 (0; 1) of consumers are shoppers, who can search and multi-stop shop freely and so will buy each product at the lowest price available. A shopper randomizes if indi¤erent about where to buy a particular product. The remaining fraction 1 of consumers are non-shoppers, who can visit only one …rm (but can do so costlessly). Non-shoppers observe each …rm's product range, but do not observe prices when deciding which …rm to visit.
11 Instead they form (rational) expectations about each …rm's pricing strategy, and visit the …rm which they believe will give them the highest expected payo¤. We assume that a non-shopper randomizes when indi¤erent between visiting two or more …rms. Once they visit a …rm they observe all its prices and make their purchase decisions. Each …rm sets its price(s) to maximize expected pro…ts, given consumer search strategies and other …rms'pricing strategies.
Some remarks on our modeling approach. We have assumed that non-shoppers cannot search beyond the …rst visited store. This implies that when there are no multiproduct 8 Or equivalently one …rm has the opportunity to acquire the other. We assume that horizontal merger between two …rms selling the same product is not permitted (or is too costly), for instance due to antitrust policy. 9 In practice mergers may be costly to propose, but could also generate economies of scope and therefore long-term cost savings. We assume this away to highlight the e¤ect of one-stop shopping convenience. However introducing this into the model would not change the main qualitative insights. 10 Given multiproduct …rms charge separate prices for each product, our model is actually isomorphic to a game of store location choice, where each pair of single-product …rms which supply di¤erent products can choose whether to locate together (e.g. in a shopping mall) or stay separately. 11 The assumption that product range is observable but price is not is plausible in many cases, because prices tend to change frequently whereas product ranges are more stable.
…rms in the market, non-shoppers can only buy one product even though they want both. This is an extreme way to introduce one-stop shopping convenience from having multiproduct …rms. A less extreme approach would be to allow non-shoppers to search more …rms if they pay a search cost. One way to do that is to have non-shoppers search sequentially as in for example Stahl (1989) . However this is complicated to analyze in a multiproduct context, because typically there are multiple mixed-strategy pricing equilibria which are not outcome equivalent, and moreover their characterizations are complex (see McAfee, 1995) . In Section 3.1 we discuss an alternative way to allow nonshoppers to buy both products, and show that the main insights from the benchmark model remain unchanged. We are using a merger framework to study endogenous retail market structure. There are many examples where retailers expand their product ranges by acquisitions or mergers. For example, in the UK Amazon acquired LoveFilm to create a one-stop service for video streaming, DVD rental, and books. Very recently Sainsbury's o¤ered to acquire Argos to create a combined food and non-food retailer, with the hope of gradually relocating Argos stores into Sainsbury's supermarkets. Of course an alternative modelling approach to endogenize market structure would be to allow each …rm in the market to directly choose which products to stock. We explore such a model in Section 3.3 and show that the main insights from our merger model continue to hold. However the merger framework captures those insights in a much more parsimonious way.
Pricing under di¤erent market structures
We …rst solve for equilibrium at the second stage of the game. There are three market structures we need to consider: (i) if no merger has occurred, a market with four independent single-product …rms, (ii) if only one pair of …rms has merged, an asymmetric market with one multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms, and (iii) if both pairs of …rms have merged, a symmetric market with two multiproduct …rms.
As a preliminary step, we …rst consider a simpler game where two single-product …rms sell an identical product, some consumers are 'captive'(able to buy from only one exogenously given …rm) and others are 'non-captive'(able to buy from either …rm). The following lemma reports equilibrium pricing in this game.
0 with at least one strict inequality. Let S > 0 be the mass of consumers who can buy from either …rm. (i) There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) If N A = N B = N > 0, the unique equilibrium is that each …rm charges a random price drawn from the atomless price distribution
Each …rm earns N v.
, the unique equilibrium is that …rm A charges a random price drawn from a price distribution F A (p), where
and F A (p) has a mass point at v of size
while …rm B charges a random price drawn from the atomless price distribution
which also has support [p; v). Firm A earns N A v and …rm B earns (N B + S )v.
As usual the two …rms randomize over their price, because they face a trade-o¤ between pricing low to attract non-captives, or pricing high to exploit captives. Lemma 1 implies that …rms'price distributions can be ranked in a simple way. Firstly when the two …rms have the same number of captives (i.e. N A = N B ) they use the same price distribution. Secondly when one …rm has more captives than the other, for example N A > N B , equations (3), (5) and (6) imply that the two density functions satisfy
for p 2 [p; v). This means that …rm A charges higher prices than …rm B in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Intuitively this is because …rm A has relatively more incentive to extract surplus from its captive consumers by pricing high, than compete for non-captive consumers by pricing low.
We now return to our set-up, and use Lemma 1 to study equilibrium pricing in each of the three possible market structures outlined above, starting with the simple case of four independent single-product …rms.
Lemma 2 Suppose there are four independent single-product …rms. Non-shoppers randomly visit one …rm, and each …rm uses the mixed pricing strategy in Lemma 1(ii) with N = 1 4
(1 ) and S = . Earn …rm earns 1 4
(1 )v.
Proof. Firstly in equilibrium …rms 1 A and 1 B must have the same number of nonshoppers. Suppose, in contrast, that 1 A for example has strictly more non-shoppers than 1 B . Using Lemma 1(iii) 1 A charges strictly more in the sense of FOSD than 1 B , which is inconsistent with non-shoppers'search behavior. Secondly for the same reason, 2 A and 2 B must have an equal number of non-shoppers. Thirdly all four …rms must have the same number of non-shoppers. Suppose, in contrast, that 1 A and 1 B for example have strictly more non-shoppers than 2 A and 2 B . Using Lemma 1(ii) 1 A and 1 B charge strictly more in the sense of FOSD than 2 A and 2 B , which again yields a contradiction. Lastly then, each …rm has (1 ) non-shoppers and so the equilibrium outcome is given by Lemma 1(ii) with N A = N B = 1 4
(1 ) and S = .
Another simple case is when the market has two multiproduct …rms. It is without loss of generality to focus on an equilibrium where each …rm randomizes independently over the prices of its two products.
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Lemma 3 Suppose there are two multiproduct …rms. Non-shoppers randomly visit one …rm, and each …rm chooses the prices of its two products independently using the mixed pricing strategy in Lemma 1(ii) with N = 1 2
(1 ) and S = . Each …rm earns 1 2
(1 )v from each product.
Proof. The argument that in equilibrium non-shoppers must randomly visit one …rm is similar to Lemma 2. Hence the equilibrium outcome is given by Lemma 1(ii) with
13 A …rm's payo¤ depends only on its rival's marginal price distributions. Therefore for any equilibrium in which …rm i (for i = A; B) uses a joint price distribution F i (p 1 ; p 2 ), we can construct an alternative payo¤-equivalent equilibrium in which …rm i chooses its two prices independently using the marginal distributions of F i (p 1 ; p 2 ).
In both symmetric market structures non-shoppers visit one …rm at random, and therefore (by Lemma 1) all …rms draw their price from the same distribution. However the price distribution is lower (in the sense of FOSD) in a market with four single-product …rms compared to a market with two multiproduct …rms. This is because in the former case each single-product …rm gets only one quarter of the non-shoppers, whereas in the latter case each multiproduct …rm gets half the non-shoppers and therefore has less incentive to price aggressively to attract shoppers. This is due to the assumption (which we relax in Section 3.1 below) that a non-shopper can visit only one …rm, even if all …rms supply a single product.
Next consider the asymmetric market structure. Suppose that 1 A and 2 A have merged to form a multiproduct …rm A, but 1 B and 2 B remain as single-product …rms. A nonshopper chooses between visiting the multiproduct …rm and buying both products, for a payo¤ of
or visiting a single-product …rm i B (for i = 1; 2) for a payo¤ of
Clearly, other things equal, it is more attractive to visit the multiproduct …rm and get both products. However, on the other hand, we know from Lemma 1 that if more nonshoppers visit the multiproduct …rm than a single-product …rm, the multiproduct …rm will on average charge a higher price. Using equation (7) to compare the two payo¤s, we can state the following result:
Lemma 4 Suppose there is a multiproduct …rm A and two single-product …rms 1 B and 2 B .
(i) A non-shopper visits …rm i with probability X i , where
and
(ii) Firm A uses the mixed pricing strategy F A (p), and …rms 1 B and 2 B use the mixed pricing strategy F B (p), both given in Lemma 1(iii), with N i = (1 ) X i and S = . (iii) Firm i earns expected pro…t i on each of its products, where ) some of them buy from a single-product …rm instead. This prevents the multiproduct …rm from charging too high prices, and thus rationalizes non-shoppers' search behavior by ensuring that the payo¤s (8) and (9) are equal. Nevertheless the multiproduct …rm still attracts a disproportionate share of non-shoppers, because it o¤ers them one-stop shopping convenience. One implication of this is that for all 2 (0; 1) the multiproduct …rm charges higher prices (in the sense of FOSD) than its single-product rivals. This prediction may not …t the casual observation that large retailers are often cheaper than small ones. Remember, however, that to highlight the e¤ect of one-stop shopping convenience our model has assumed away any possible cost synergy from the merger. In reality larger retailers may enjoy economies of scale, and also be able to extract better deals from upstream suppliers. This may lead them to charge lower prices on average.
Finally, for convenience, Table 1 summarizes per-product pro…t in each of the three market structures. Here we also report total welfare as well as its components industry pro…t and aggregate consumer surplus. One useful observation is that the asymmetric market structure tends to lead to the weakest price competition, in the sense that it is the worst for consumers, and it is the best for industry pro…t whenever > . The reason is that in the asymmetric market the multiproduct …rm gets a disproportionate share of the non-shoppers, and so charges high prices; by strategic complementarity, this induces the two single-product …rms to set relatively high prices as well. 14 4 sp …rms 2 mp …rms asymmetric
Per product pro…t 
Equilibrium market structure
We can now examine the equilibrium market structure when both pairs of …rms (1 A ,2 A ) and (1 B ; 2 B ) have the opportunity to merge before engaging in price competition. Using our earlier results, we can state that:
the unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcome is that the market has one multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms.
(ii) When < 1 2 the unique equilibrium outcome is that the market has two multiproduct …rms.
Intuitively a merger between a pair of …rms leads to two di¤erent e¤ects. Firstly there is a "search e¤ect": the merging …rms o¤er one-stop shopping convenience and so become more attractive to non-shoppers. Consequently the merged entity is searched by more non-shoppers. Secondly though, there is a "price competition e¤ect": the merger changes the market structure and hence the intensity of competition. As discussed earlier, at an industry level the asymmetric market structure typically leads to the softest price competition.
Proposition 1 can then be explained as follows. There is no equilibrium with four single-product …rms, because if one pair deviates and merges, both e¤ects work in their favor i.e. they secure higher demand and soften overall competition. 15 (In fact Table 1 shows that the remaining single-product …rms also bene…t from the …rst merger.) However if the second pair contemplates merging they face a trade-o¤, since a merger restores symmetry and so intensi…es competition. When there are relatively many shoppers ( 1 2 ) the second pair of …rms do not merge, because it is more important to avoid strong competition for the shoppers. Hence the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric, even though …rms start o¤ symmetric. 16 However when there are relatively many non-shoppers
) the second pair of …rms do merge, because it is more important to capture a high share of the non-shoppers. Hence the equilibrium market structure is symmetric.
Corollary 1 Compared to the initial situation with four single-product …rms, the equilibrium market structure in Proposition 1 results in strictly higher welfare and …rm pro…ts, but (weakly) lower consumer surplus.
The market outcome with merger is better for total welfare due to a positive "market coverage e¤ect": non-shoppers generate more surplus when they visit a multiproduct …rm and buy two products instead of one. 17 The market outcome also increases each …rm's pro…t: price competition is weaker, either because of the resulting asymmetric market structure (when 1 2
), or because more non-shoppers visit each multiproduct …rm (when < 1 2 ). However consumers are made worse o¤ because they pay higher prices on average, and this (weakly) dominates the fact that non-shoppers can now buy both products.
Finally, notice that the fraction of non-shoppers (i.e. 1 ) is a measure of search frictions in this baseline model. Interestingly once we endogenize market structure, a higher search friction does not necessarily harm consumers. This is shown graphically in Figure 1 below, which plots for v = 1 total welfare (the top horizontal line), industry pro…t (the thick solid lines), and aggregate consumer surplus (the dashed lines) against 1 . Intuitively when 1 1 2 the market structure is asymmetric, and a larger search friction relaxes competition to the detriment of consumers but the bene…t of …rms. However around the point = 1 2 the market structure changes and becomes symmetric with two big multiproduct …rms, such that competition intensi…es and consumer surplus jumps up and industry pro…t jumps down in the search friction. However total welfare is constant because demand is inelastic. 17 Notice that in the current setting with inelastic demand, the price competition e¤ect of merger does not a¤ect total welfare. 18 When demand is elastic, total welfare changes with 1 in a similar way as do the dashed lines in Figure 1 .
Extensions and Robustness Discussion
This section shows that the main insights from the benchmark model are robust to various extensions.
Allowing non-shoppers to multi-stop shop
We now relax our earlier assumption that non-shoppers can only visit one …rm (and so can only buy one good when all …rms are single-product). To make this extension simple, we assume that at the beginning of the pricing game (in each possible market structure) non-shoppers can choose to either (i) visit one (single-product or multiproduct) …rm at zero cost, or (ii) visit two single-product …rms (if available) at a cost s > 0. The model is otherwise the same as before. (Our modeling approach here is therefore ruling out the possibility that non-shoppers can visit two multiproduct …rms, or one multiproduct …rm and one or two single-product …rms. This greatly simpli…es the analysis and captures the idea that time-constrained consumers want to buy both products but do not …nd it worthwhile to search for lower prices.) Notice that we may loosely interpret s as a measure of one-stop shopping convenience generated by having a multiproduct …rm.
First consider equilibrium pricing in the two symmetric market structures. When there are four single-product …rms, non-shoppers can either visit one …rm only or visit two …rms with di¤erent products by paying the search cost s. We focus on the case where s is small enough such that non-shoppers will visit two …rms and buy both products.
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For reasons analogous to those in the benchmark model, each …rm must then receive the same mass of non-shoppers i.e. N = 1 2
(1 ). When instead there are two multiproduct …rms, non-shoppers choose one …rm to visit and the model is identical to the one that we solved earlier, and hence each …rm again receives a mass N = 1 2
(1 ) of non-shoppers. Consequently equilibrium price distributions and per-product pro…ts are now identical in the two symmetric market structures, and given by Lemma 3 from earlier. However consumer surplus is strictly higher when there are two multiproduct …rms, because nonshoppers can buy both products without having to pay s.
Second consider the asymmetric market structure. Now non-shoppers have three options: visit the multiproduct …rm only, visit one single-product …rm only, or visit both single-product …rms by paying the search cost s. Let X (s; ) and Y (s; ) denote the fractions of non-shoppers who visit a multiproduct …rm and both single-product …rms respectively. (Then the remaining 1 X (s; ) Y (s; ) non-shoppers visit one single-product …rm only.) We can then show the following:
Lemma 5 Suppose there is one multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms. There exists a unique equilibrium, whose exact form depends on the thresholdss ( ) < _ s ( ) < s ( ) which we de…ne in the appendix. (i) When 1 2 non-shoppers search either the multiproduct …rm, or both single-product …rms. X (s; ) is strictly increasing in s 2 (0; s ( )) and satis…es
and s 2 (0;s ( )] non-shoppers search either the multiproduct …rm, or both single-product …rms. X (s; ) is strictly increasing in s and satis…es (10).
and s 2 (s ( ) ; _ s ( )) non-shoppers randomize between searching the multiproduct …rm, both single-product …rms, and one of the single-product …rms.
whilst X (s; ) is strictly decreasing in s and uniquely solves
(iv) When < 1 2 and s _ s ( ) non-shoppers search the multiproduct …rm with probability X (s; ) = 1 2 (1 ) and otherwise search one randomly chosen single-product …rm.
The pricing equilibrium in the asymmetric market is more complicated than in the benchmark model, but the interpretation of Lemma 5 is straightforward. For instance consider the case where < 1=2. When s is relatively low (belows ( )), non-shoppers randomize over where to shop, with some searching the multiproduct …rm, and others searching both of the single-product …rms. As s increases it becomes more attractive to search the multiproduct …rm and avoid paying s. Therefore to ensure that non-shoppers are willing to randomize, the multiproduct …rm's relative prices should increase, which is achieved by having more non-shoppers search it. This explains why X(s; ) increases in s. However when s is su¢ ciently large (aboves ( )), the multiproduct …rm becomes so expensive that non-shoppers also …nd attractive the option of searching only one singleproduct …rm. Therefore at this point some non-shoppers also search just one singleproduct …rm. As s further increases, fewer and fewer non-shoppers opt to search both single-product …rms. Eventually s becomes so large (above _ s ( )) that no non-shopper searches both single-product …rms. At this point the equilibrium is exactly the same as in our earlier benchmark model. Now consider the equilibrium retail market structure:
Proposition 2 There exists an (s) 2
(weakly) increasing in s such that: (i) When (s) the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric. (ii) When < (s) the equilibrium market structure is two multiproduct …rms.
Qualitatively the market structure is the same as in the benchmark model. A …rst merger is always pro…table, because the merging …rms soften competition and attract higher demand. Intuitively, the merged entity attracts a disproportionate share of nonshoppers, because it enables them to buy both products without needing to incur the additional cost s > 0. A second merger is then pro…table if and only if is su¢ ciently low. As in the benchmark model, a second merger has both a price and search e¤ect, with the latter dominating when there are relatively few shoppers in the market. The result that the threshold (s) (weakly) increases in s implies that when one-stop shopping convenience becomes more important, it is more likely that the market has two multiproduct …rms. Finally as in the benchmark model, we are also able to show that the asymmetric market structure is the worst for consumers, but the best for industry pro…t provided that is not too small.
More …rms and heterogeneous consumers
This section extends the benchmark model in two ways. First we consider n 2 pairs of …rms, which we denote by (1 j ; 2 j ) for j = 1; ; n. Second we allow for the coexistence of both single-product and multiproduct consumers. In particular a consumer's valuation for a product is now v with probability > 0, and 0 with probability 1 . Valuations are drawn independently across products and consumers, and do not depend on whether or not a consumer is a shopper. Therefore 2 consumers want to buy both products, (1 ) want to buy only product i (i = 1; 2), and the rest of the consumers want nothing. The model and timing are otherwise the same as in the benchmark model from Section 2 (which therefore corresponds to the special case of n = 2 and = 1).
This extended model is less straightforward to analyze than the benchmark model, because price competition in an asymmetric market with n > 2 is more complicated. We show in the Online Appendix that in the asymmetric market structure, non-shoppers' search behavior depends on whether R k n where k denotes the number of multiproduct …rms. When < k n , the ratio of consumers demanding two products to …rms supplying two products is relatively low. We show that in this case non-shoppers requiring both products search a multiproduct …rm, whilst non-shoppers who want only one product randomly choose between all …rms in the marketplace. This mixing is done in such a way that all …rms use the same price distribution and earn the same pro…t. We also show that the case > k n is more complicated and depends upon the exact number of multiproduct …rms. Nevertheless as is intuitive, multiproduct …rms charge more in the sense of FOSD, and non-shoppers wanting only one product buy it from a relevant single-product …rm.
The following proposition reports the equilibrium market structure. (Its proof is relegated to the Online Appendix.)
Proposition 3 (i) When n = 2 the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric if
1+
, and otherwise has two multiproduct …rms.
(ii) Suppose n 3 and that a pair of single-product …rms choose not to merge when they are indi¤erent. Then (a) if 1 1 n , the market has dn e multiproduct …rms. (b) If > 1 1 n , the market has either n 1 or n multiproduct …rms. If is su¢ ciently large, there are n 1 multiproduct …rms, and if is su¢ ciently small, there are n multiproduct …rms.
The n = 2 case is thus qualitatively the same as in the benchmark model, except that the critical threshold for is now a function of consumer needs. When n 3, an asymmetric market structure always arises when is small i.e. when relatively few consumers are interested in both products, such that 'demand'for multiproduct …rms is weak. In a similar spirit when is relatively large, at most one pair of single-product …rms will remain in the market. Whether all …rms merge or not depends on the search friction, in a way that is qualitatively the same as in the baseline model. 
Allowing …rms to choose product ranges
We now consider an alternative way to endogenize market structure. Instead of allowing single-product …rms to merge, we now let each …rm in the market directly choose its product range. We suppose there are three …rms A; B; C in the market. (Three is the minimum number required to generate the asymmetric market structure with at least one multiproduct …rm and one single-product …rm for each product.) We normalize the …xed cost of stocking one product to zero, and then let > 0 denote the incremental …xed 20 Unfortunately it is di¢ cult to derive a cut-o¤ result on as we do in the case with n = 2, because a non-shopper's search problem is much less tractable.
cost of stocking a second product. 21 The …rms play a two-stage game where they …rst simultaneously choose product ranges, and then observe their rivals' choices and select a price for each of their products. In all other respects the set-up is the same as in the benchmark model. We focus on deriving conditions under which there exists an asymmetric market structure with one multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms supplying di¤erent products. Without loss of generality, consider a hypothetical equilibrium where …rm A supplies both products, and …rms B and C supply product 1 and product 2 respectively. Using Lemma 4 from earlier, …rms'expected pro…ts in this market structure are
:
There are three possible deviations that we need to check. (i) Suppose a single-product …rm, say …rm B, deviates by stocking both products. Then the market has two multiproduct …rms A and B and a single-product …rm C supplying product 2 only. As we show in the proof of the proposition below, in this scenario non-shoppers randomly visit one of the two multiproduct …rms, and …rm B's deviation pro…t is (1 )v .
(ii) Alternatively suppose the multiproduct …rm A deviates by dropping one product, say product 2. Then the market has two single-product …rms A and B supplying product 1 and one single-product …rm C supplying product 2. Clearly …rm C will charge the monopoly price v because it is the only supplier of product 2. Hence applying Lemma 1 from earlier, non-shoppers randomize between visiting …rm A or …rm B, such that …rm A's deviation pro…t is 1 2
(1 )v. (iii) Finally suppose a single-product …rm, say …rm B, deviates by dropping its current product and stocking the other instead. Then the market has one multiproduct …rm A and two single-product …rms B and C both supplying product 2 only. Again since …rm A is the only supplier of product 1 it charges the monopoly price v for product 1. Non-shoppers must then randomize between all three …rms, such that by the usual logic …rm B's deviation pro…t is there exist ( ) < ( ) such that for 2 [ ( ); ( )] it is an equilibrium that one …rm supplies both products and the other two …rms each supply a di¤erent product.
Proposition 4 shows that in order to have an asymmetric market structure we require that 1 4
, and also that the …xed cost is neither too high (otherwise the multiproduct …rm will drop one product) nor too low (otherwise a single-product …rm will add another product). The requirement that 1 4 is consistent with our earlier merger framework, in which an asymmetric outcome arose if and only if the fraction of shoppers was su¢ ciently high.
Finally, we can also derive conditions under which any of the other possible market structures is an equilibrium. The details are lengthy and so we omit them, but there are two observations. Firstly, for a …xed the number of multiproduct …rms tends to decrease as increases. Secondly, for a …xed (and su¢ ciently small) the number of multiproduct …rms tends to increase as decreases (i.e. as the search friction increases). This is again consistent with our earlier merger framework.
Product di¤erentiation and sequential search
This section explores an alternative framework with product di¤erentiation and sequential search. We show that the search friction a¤ects equilibrium market structure in a similar way to what we found in the homogenous goods case. However we also highlight some important di¤erences with our earlier results. For example in an asymmetric market the multiproduct …rm charges lower prices than its smaller rivals even if it has no cost advantage.
We return to the merger framework in Section 2. There are two products 1 and 2, and consumers wish to buy one unit of each. Initially there are four single-product …rms, with …rms i A and i B supplying horizontally di¤erentiated versions of product i (for i = 1; 2). Following Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) we use the random utility framework to model product di¤erentiation. In particular the match utility of each product i is a random draw from a common distribution G(u) with support [u; u] and density g(u). The realization of the match utility is i.i.d. across consumers, products, and …rms, as consistent for example with consumers having idiosyncratic tastes. If a consumer buys a product with match utility u and pays a price p, she obtains a surplus u p. We follow Anderson and Renault (1999) and assume that in equilibrium all consumers buy both products. This is the case if consumers have a su¢ ciently high basic valuation for each product i.e. u is su¢ ciently high.
The timing is as before: at the …rst stage each pair of …rms which supply di¤erent products simultaneously decides whether or not to merge; at the second stage their merger decisions are observed by all parties, and prices are chosen. However unlike in the benchmark model, consumers all have the same search technology. In particular consumers are initially uninformed about …rms'prices and match values, although they know the match utility distribution G(u) and also hold rational expectations about each …rm's pricing strategy. A consumer can learn a …rm's prices and match utilities by incurring a search cost s > 0; search is sequential and with costless recall. To capture the idea of one-stop shopping convenience, we assume that the search cost is the same whether a consumer visits a single-product or a multiproduct …rm. To have active search in each possible market structure, we assume that the search cost is not too high i.e.
As before we …rst derive the pricing equilibrium in each possible market structure, and then examine the equilibrium market structure.
A market with four single-product …rms. With four single-product …rms, a consumer's search process is separable across the two product markets. In each market we have a duopoly version of the sequential search model in Anderson and Renault (1999) . Consider the market for product i. We look for a symmetric equilibrium where both …rms charge the same price p 0 and consumers search in a random order (i.e. half of the consumers visit …rm i A …rst and the other half visit …rm i B …rst). In symmetric equilibrium the optimal stopping rule is characterized by a reservation utility level a which solves
(The left-hand side is the expected bene…t from sampling the second …rm when the …rst …rm o¤ers match utility a.) This equation has a unique solution a 2 (0; u) given the search cost condition (13). In equilibrium a consumer buys immediately at the …rst visited …rm if and only if its match utility is no less than a. As explained in the appendix, the …rst-order condition for the equilibrium price is
In equilibrium …rms share the market equally, and so each …rm earns pro…t 0 = 1 2 p 0 . For example when valuations are uniformly distributed with G(u) = u, we have a = 1 p 2s and condition (13) requires s < . The …rst-order condition then implies that 22 We can show that if p[1 G(p)] is concave, then the …rst-order condition is also su¢ cient for de…ning the equilibrium price. See Appendix B in Anderson and Renault (1999) for other conditions which ensure the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy pricing equilibrium.
It is depicted as the dashed curve in Figure 2a below.
A market with two multiproduct …rms. With two multiproduct …rms we have a multiproduct search model as analyzed in Zhou (2014) . Let p m denote the equilibrium price for each product. We …rst report the optimal stopping rule in an equilibrium where both …rms charge the same prices. Consider a consumer who visits …rm A …rst. After visiting …rm A she faces the following options: stop searching and buy both products, or buy one product and keep searching for the other, or keep searching for both products. Given that the search cost occurs at the …rm level and consumers have free recall, the second option is always dominated by the third. If the consumer continues to visit …rm B, she can thereafter freely mix and match among the two …rms. Therefore the consumer will stop searching and buy both products at …rm A if the match utilities (u 1A ; u 2A ) satisfy
(The left-hand side is the expected bene…t from sampling …rm B.) This condition de…nes a reservation frontier u 2A = (u 1A ), where ( ) is a decreasing and convex function. If the match utilities (u 1A ; u 2A ) at …rm A are such that u 2A (u 1A ) the consumer buys immediately, otherwise she searches …rm B.
We refer the reader to Zhou (2014) for details of how to derive the equilibrium price. For a general distribution, the …rst-order condition for the equilibrium price is
where a is de…ned in (14). In equilibrium …rms share the market equally, so each …rm's per product pro…t is m = 1 2 p m . In the uniform distribution example, the …rst-order condition implies that
where 3:14 is the mathematical constant. It is depicted as the lowest solid curve in Figure 2a below. Zhou (2014) proves that p m < p 0 i.e. products become cheaper when single-product …rms merge into two multiproduct …rms. This di¤ers from the result in the homogenous goods model in Section 2, and arises due to the following joint-search e¤ect. Intuitively when a …rm reduces one product's price, more consumers who visit it …rst will stop 23 As explained in Zhou (2014) , in general it is hard to derive a simple su¢ cient condition for the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. But for many common distributions (including the uniform distribution) the …rst-order condition is su¢ cient for de…ning the equilibrium price. searching and buy both products. That is, reducing one product's price can increase the demand for the other product as well. Hence the two products behave like complements, inducing each …rm to price more aggressively. This joint-search e¤ect did not arise in the benchmark model, because no consumers had a sequential search decision to make.
An asymmetric market. Consider the asymmetric case with a multiproduct …rm A and two single-product …rms 1 B and 2 B . Let p A be the multiproduct …rm's price and p B be each single-product …rm's price. We look for an equilibrium where all consumers visit the multiproduct …rm …rst. Notice that the cost of visiting each single-product …rm is separable, and so a consumer's search decision when she is at the multiproduct …rm is also separable between the two products. This means, for example, that she searches the single-product …rm i B if and only if the multiproduct …rm's product i has a surplus less than a p B , where a is de…ned in (14). Therefore unlike the case with two multiproduct …rms, there is no joint-search e¤ect here. The multiproduct …rm competes with its smaller rivals in two separate single-product markets where consumers search non-randomly. (As such the pricing problem is similar to the one studied by Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou, 2009 , where one …rm is prominent and always visited …rst by consumers.)
As explained in the appendix, the …rst-order conditions for the equilibrium prices
where
is the equilibrium demand for …rm A's product i. Firm A's per product pro…t is A = p A Q( ) and each singleproduct …rm's pro…t is B = p B (1 Q( )). This analysis implicitly assumes that all consumers visit …rm A …rst and that a > u. The following result provides a condition for the system of equations in (18) to have a solution 2 (0; a u). With > 0 i.e. p A < p B , the consumer search order is indeed optimal, because the multiproduct …rm both o¤ers lower prices and provides one-stop shopping convenience.
25
Lemma 6 Suppose 1 G is strictly log-concave and condition (13) holds. Then the system of equations in (18) has a solution 2 (0; a u).
Therefore under the regularity condition there is an equilibrium in this asymmetric market where the multiproduct …rm is cheaper than its single-product rivals and all 24 As in the case with four single-product …rms, the …rst-order conditions are also su¢ cient for de…ning the equilibrium prices if p[1 G(p)] is concave. 25 Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) show a similar result without assuming full market coverage, but they focus on the uniform distribution case.
consumers visit the multiproduct …rm …rst. The prediction that p A < p B is di¤erent to what we observed in our earlier model with homogenous products. Here, a consumer visits a single-product …rm only if she is unsatis…ed with the multiproduct …rm's product. Therefore when a consumer searches a single-product …rm, she reveals something about her preferences. This gives the single-product …rm extra market power and induces it to charge a higher price. 26 Nevertheless as we will see below, both p A and p B tend to be higher than p 0 and p m . This is similar to the benchmark model, where price competition was typically softest when the market structure was asymmetric.
In the uniform distribution example, (18) simpli…es to
where a = 1 p 2s. It has a unique solution:
where K p 17a 2 30a + 49. The prices are depicted as the second highest and the highest solid curves respectively in Figure 2a Equilibrium market structure. For a general match utility distribution, it is hard to compare pro…ts and study the equilibrium market structure. Therefore to make progress we focus on the uniform distribution case with G(u) = u. It can be veri…ed that p A > p 0 for any s 2 (0; 1 2 ) and so the four prices can be ranked as p m < p 0 < p A < p B . (They are depicted in Figure 2a below.) As in the benchmark model with homogenous products, the asymmetric market structure generates the highest market prices (and so also the highest industry pro…t, given the assumption of full market coverage). Di¤erent from the benchmark model, here the market structure with two multiproduct …rms yields the lowest market prices and industry pro…t. Figure 2b above compares per product pro…t across market structures. The dashed curve is 0 (each …rm's pro…t in the case with four single-product …rms), the middle (almost horizontal) solid curve is m (each …rm's per product pro…t in the case with two multiproduct …rms), and the other high and low curves are respectively A and B (the multiproduct …rm's per product pro…t and each single-product …rm's pro…t in the asymmetric case). A few observations follow: (i) A > 0 , so starting from the initial situation with four single-product …rms, each pair of …rms have a unilateral incentive to merge. (ii) B > m if and only if s is less than about 0:092. We can then deduce that if s is less than 0:092, the (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric market with a multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms. On the other hand, if s is greater than 0:092, each pair of …rms chooses to merge and the market has two multiproduct …rms. This leads to the lowest industry pro…t, and so …rms end up in a prisoner's dilemma.
Therefore at least for the case of a uniform distribution, the search friction a¤ects market structure in a similar way as it did in the model with homogeneous products. Again there is a trade-o¤ between the search e¤ect and the price competition e¤ect. In particular when there is already a multiproduct retailer in the market, a merger between the remaining single-product …rms (i) makes them more prominent in consumers'search order, boosting their demand, but (ii) also intensi…es price competition. The latter e¤ect dominates when s is small, whilst the former e¤ect dominates otherwise.
As far as consumer surplus is concerned, the market structure with two multiproduct …rms is the best since it leads to the lowest market prices and also saves search costs for consumers. Numerical simulations show that the asymmetric market structure is the worst for consumers when s is less than about 0:055, and otherwise the initial situation with four single-product …rms is the worst. Then as in the benchmark model, due to the endogeneity of the market structure, reducing the search cost does not always improve consumers surplus.
Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a simple and tractable framework to study equilibrium retail market structure when consumers buy multiple products and value one-stop shopping convenience. We have shown that the size of the search friction plays an important role in determining the equilibrium market structure. When search frictions are relatively high the market has all large …rms. When search frictions are relatively low the market is asymmetric, such that large and small …rms coexist. This is because some …rms choose to remain unmerged in order to weaken the amount of price competition in the market. Among all possible market structures, the asymmetric market structure delivers the weakest price competition, and as such minimizes consumer surplus and often maximizes industry pro…t. Consequently our model suggests a potential anti-competitive e¤ect of mergers among …rms which supply di¤erent products. Our model also suggests that once the endogeneity of market structure is taken into account, reducing search frictions does not necessarily lower market prices and improve consumer welfare.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs and Details
Proof of Lemma 1. These results can be found in the existing literature. We provide proofs here for completeness.
(i) The proof is standard and so omitted.
(ii) We …rst verify that this is an equilibrium. Since the other …rm is using the atomless price distribution F , a …rm's pro…t at p < v is p[N + S(1 F (p))], whilst its pro…t at p = v is N v. The expression for F in (1) equalizes these two pro…ts, such that each …rm is indi¤erent among all prices in [p; v] , where the lower bound p in (2) is derived from F (p) = 0. It is also clear that neither …rm has an incentive to charge a price below p. Varian (1980) proves there are no other symmetric equilibria, whilst Baye et al. (1992) prove there are no asymmetric equilibria either.
(iii) Again we begin by verifying that this is an equilibrium. Consider …rm A …rst. Given that …rm B is using the equilibrium strategy
The expression for F B in (6) equalizes these two pro…ts. The lower bound of the support p in (4) is derived from F B (p) = 0. Firm A is then indi¤erent among all prices between p and v, and also has no incentive to charge a price below p. Now consider …rm B. Given that …rm A is using the equilibrium strategy F A , B's pro…t at p < v is p[N B + S(1 F A (p))]. When p converges to v from below, B's pro…t converges to v[N B + S ] since F A has a mass point of size at p = v. The expression for F A in (3) equalizes these two pro…ts. Given the mass point of F A , …rm B never wants to charge a price exactly at p = v because it is dominated by a price slightly below v. Hence the support of F B is open at v. in (5) is derived from F A (p) = 0. Then …rm B has no incentive to charge a price below p either. Narasimhan (1988) establishes uniqueness of this equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Notice that in equilibrium each single-product …rm must have the same number of non-shoppers, such that
(1 N A ). Notice also that in equilibrium the multiproduct …rm must receive some non-shoppers, otherwise it would charge lower prices in the sense of FOSD than the single-product …rms, invalidating non-shoppers'search behavior. Notice also that (8) exceeds (9) if and only if (1 )(1 X A ). According to (19), non-shoppers will be indi¤erent between visiting a multiproduct …rm and a single-product …rm only if = 1 2 , or equivalently
The requirement X A 2 (0; 1) yields the condition < v. In each case N A > N B so equilibrium price distributions follow from Lemma 1(iii).
Further details for Table 1 . (i) Consider four single-product …rms. Shoppers buy two products and non-shoppers one product, hence total welfare is (1+ )v. Using Lemma 2 industry pro…t is (1 ) v. Aggregate consumer surplus is therefore 2 v.
(ii) Consider two multiproduct …rms. All consumers buy two products, so total welfare is 2v. Using Lemma 3 industry pro…t is 2 (1 ) v. Aggregate consumer surplus is therefore 2 v. (iii) Consider the asymmetric market structure and recall Lemma 4. If 1 2 industry pro…t is 2(1 2 )v, total welfare is 2v, and so aggregate consumer surplus is 2 2 v. If < Proof of Lemma 5. Notice that Lemma 1 still applies in this extension once nonshoppers' search behavior is given. As in the benchmark model, the multiproduct …rm must attract a positive mass of non-shoppers, whilst each single-product …rm must attract the same number of non-shoppers. Here it is more convenient to use the price density function. Let f A (p) denote the density of the multiproduct …rm's price distribution and 0 its mass point. Let f B (p) denote the density of a single-product …rm's price distribution. A non-shopper's expected payo¤ from searching the multiproduct …rm is
where the equality follows from equation (7). A non-shopper's expected payo¤ from visiting both single-product …rms is
whilst the expected payo¤ from visiting just one single-product …rm is
Step 1 
Step 2. Look for an equilibrium where X 2 (0; 1) non-shoppers search the multiproduct …rm, and the other 1 X search both single-product …rms i.e. N A = (1 ) X and
and p = , is strictly increasing in X 2 (0; 1), and equals s ( ) when evaluated at X = 1. Therefore a necessary condition for the equilibrium is that s < s ( ). (If we let X (s; ) denote the solution to (10), we also have that X (s; ) > ; 1 , and note thats ( ) < s ( ). Hence for < 1 2
an equilibrium exists if and only if s <s ( ).
Step 3. Look for an equilibrium where X > 0 non-shoppers search the multiproduct …rm, Y > 0 search both single-product …rms, and 1 X Y > 0 search one singleproduct …rm i.e. N A = (1 ) X and N B =
(1 )(1 X+Y ) 2
. Lemma 1(iii) then implies that =
v. Firstly this equilibrium 27 As mentioned in the text, in the case with four single-product …rms we assume s is small enough that all consumers buy both products. This requires that s
where F (p) is the price distribution given in Lemma 1(ii) with N = 1 2 . After some algebra this threshold can be shown to exceed s ( ). . Fourthly, the equilibrium also requires that (21) equals (22), and this holds if and only if equation (12) from earlier holds. It is straightforward to show that the right-hand side of (12) is strictly decreasing in X 2 (0; 1), and (for < . Let _ s ( ) denote the right-hand side of (12) when evaluated at X = 1 2(1 )
. Still assuming that < 1 2
, we note that
which in turn implies thats ( ) < _ s ( ), and after some algebra we can also show that _ s ( ) < s ( ). Given the previous steps, it is then immediate that the equilibrium exists if and only if < 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Firstly we derive pro…ts in the asymmetric market structure. As is standard the multiproduct …rm A earns a per-product pro…t of A = N A v whilst a single-product …rm B earns B = (N B + ) v. Recall that X (s; ) and Y (s; ) are the fractions of non-shoppers that visit respectively the multiproduct …rm and two single-product …rms. Hence we have that N A = (1 ) X (s; ) and N B = (1 )
. Moreover from the proof of Lemma 5 we know that X (s; ) > 1 2 , such that N A > N B . This in turn implies that by Lemma 1(iii) we have
Hence we can write
Secondly there is no equilibrium with four single-product …rms. As argued in the main text, with four single-product …rms each product earns pro…t (1 )
. Therefore if one pair deviate and merge, by equation (24) their per-product pro…t strictly increases.
Hence at least one pair merge. Thirdly consider the incentive of the second pair to merge. As argued in the main text, after a second merger each product earns pro…t (1 ) v 2 . Hence the second pair does not merge (such that the market structure is asymmetric) if and only if (25) provided that X (s; ) < 1, which is clearly true because from the proof of Lemma 5 we have X (s; ) < 
Clearly (26) . We also claim that for 2 ( . Hence, the critical threshold is
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof consists of two parts. (i) We start by deriving the pricing equilibrium after the …rst deviation i.e. when both A and B are multiproduct …rms but C sells only product 2. Let F 1 be the price distribution that A and B use for product 1. Let F 2 be the price distribution used by A and B for product 2, andF 2 be the price distribution used by C for product 2. We …rst look for an equilibrium where all non-shoppers randomly visit one of the two multiproduct …rms. Since each multiproduct …rm then has half of the non-shoppers, F 1 satis…es
Turning to product 2, since the single-product …rm C does not have any non-shoppers, its multiproduct competitors'price distribution has a mass point at the monopoly price v. Following the standard logic, F 2 andF 2 are determined by the following system of equations:
where is the size of F 2 's mass point. It is straightforward to solve for F 2 ,F 2 and . One can also check that all three price distributions have a common lower bound. By comparing (27) and (28), it is easy to see thatF 2 (p) < F 1 (p). That is, …rm C's product 2 is more expensive than the multiproduct …rms'product 1. Therefore all non-shoppers prefer to visit a multiproduct …rm, consistent with our initial conjecture. (Using a similar logic we can also show that there is no equilibrium where some non-shoppers visit the single-product …rm C.) (ii) We now derive conditions under which none of the three deviations is pro…table. (1 )v. The two conditions simplify to (1 )v. The two conditions simplify to
Further details on the model with product di¤erentiation.
The case with four single-product …rms. To derive the equilibrium price for product i, suppose …rm i A unilaterally deviates and charges a price p 
(ii) The other half of consumers visit …rm i B …rst. Since they hold an equilibrium belief about …rm i A 's price, they visit …rm i A if u B < a. They then buy from …rm i A if
Adding these three demand components together, one can check that in symmetric equilibrium each …rm sells to half the consumers, and that the slope of demand is
2 du. Therefore the …rst-order condition for p 0 is given by equation (15). The asymmetric case. Consider the market for product i. Demand for the multiproduct …rm's product, if it charges p 0 A while its single-product rival i B sets the equilibrium price p B , is
This is explained as follows. All consumers visit …rm A …rst. The …rst term is consumers who …nd u A p 0 A a p B and so buy immediately. The second term is consumers who …nd u A p 0 A < a p B and so search …rm i B , but who subsequently return to buy from …rm A because u B p B < u A p 0 A . Demand for …rm i B 's product, if it charges price p 0 B while …rm A sets its equilibrium price p A , is
This is because all consumers visit …rm A …rst, and hold an equilibrium belief about …rm i B 's price. Therefore they search …rm i B if u A p A < a p B , and then buy from it if
Here Q( ) is the equilibrium demand for …rm A (i.e. (29) Proof of Lemma 6. Using (18) we get the following equation:
we can show that (0) > 0 if and only if
This inequality holds because
where the inequality uses the fact that logconcavity of 1 G implies
Using L'Hôpital's rule we also have that
where the …rst inequality again uses logconcavity of 1 F . Therefore by continuity ( ) = has a solution between 0 and a u.
Online Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
The number of non-shoppers who need both products is N b = (1 ) 2 , and the number of non-shoppers who need only product i, i = 1; 2, is N i = (1 ) (1 ). The number of shoppers for each product is S = . Henceforth we call these two types of non-shoppers N b and N i respectively. Denote by m (k), k 1, a multiproduct …rm's per product pro…t when there are k multiproduct …rms in the market, and by s (k), k n 1, a single-product …rm's pro…t when there are k multiproduct …rms in the market.
We …rst consider the simple case where no …rms merge or all …rms merge.
Claim 1 With all single-product …rms (k = 0) or all multiproduct …rms (k = n), nonshoppers search randomly and each …rm's (per product) pro…t is respectively
Proof. With all single-product …rms, multiproduct non-shoppers visit a …rm randomly and single-product non-shoppers visit a relevant …rm randomly, 28 so the number of non-shoppers each …rm has is
This determines each …rm's pro…t s (0). With all multi-product …rms, all non-shoppers visit a …rm randomly, and so the number of non-shoppers each …rm has at the product level is
This determines each …rm's per product pro…t m (n).
We now turn to an asymmetric market structure with 1 k n 2 such that at least two pairs of single-product …rms remain. (The asymmetric case with k = n 1 will be treated separately.) We need the following two results from Baye et al. (1992) .
Claim 2 (Asymmetric Varian Model) Consider a Varian pricing game where n …rms supply a homogenous product and consumers have identical valuations v. Suppose there 28 In equilibrium non-shoppers must search randomly. If they did not, one …rm would have more nonshoppers than another, such that it would charge higher prices and thereby contradict non-shoppers' search behavior. See Section V of Baye et al. (1992) for a formal proof.
are S > 0 shoppers in the market. Suppose each …rm j 2 f1;
; lg has N A > 0 nonshoppers and each …rm j 2 fl + 1;
; ng has N B < N A non-shoppers. There is an equilibrium where the …rst l …rms use a price distribution F A and the remaining n l …rms use a price distribution F B , where F A FOSD F B , and if l n 2 (i.e. if the second group has at least two …rms), F A degenerates at the monopoly price v.
Proof. See Appendix B of Baye et al. (1992) .
29
Claim 3 (Asymmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Varian Model) In the Varian pricing game described in Claim 2 with n 3, if all …rms equally share the non-shoppers (i.e. if N A = N B ), then as well as the standard symmetric equilibrium, there exist asymmetric equilibria where a group of …rms j 2 f1;
; lg, l n 2, adopt a price distribution F A with support [p; r] [ fvg where r < v, and the rest of the …rms j 2 fl + 1;
; ng adopt an atomless price distribution F B with support [p; v]. Moreover, F A FOSD F B , and
Proof. See Theorem 1 in Baye et al. (1992) . 30 The following result reports the equilibrium outcome in an asymmetric market with 1 k n 2. 
Proof. We …rst exclude the possibility that all non-shoppers (i.e. both N b and N i ) search in a deterministic way or in a random way. The proof consists of four steps. (i) It is impossible that all non-shoppers visit multiproduct …rms. If that were the case, the single-product …rms would sell only to shoppers and so set price equal to zero. The multiproduct …rms would sell only to non-shoppers and so charge v. This would contradict the optimality of non-shoppers'search behavior.
29 When l n 3 (i.e., when the second group has at least three …rms), there are also equilibria where the …rms in the second group use di¤erent price distributions. In our subsequent analysis, we focus on the equilibrium stated in the claim. 30 When l 2, there also exist asymmetric equilibria where the …rms in the …rst group use di¤erent distributions. In our subsequent analysis, we focus on the equilibrium stated in the claim.
(ii) It is also impossible that all non-shoppers visit single-product …rms. If that were the case, single-product …rms would charge higher prices than multiproduct …rms in the sense of FOSD. (If k 2, single-product …rms would actually charge the monopoly price.) But this again would render non-shoppers'search behavior non-optimal.
(iii) It is also impossible that all N b visit multiproduct …rms and all N i visit singleproduct …rms supplying product i (except in the edge case
which we ignore). If that were the case, each multiproduct …rm would have N b k non-shoppers per product, and each single-product …rm would have
, then according to Claim 2 single-product …rms would charge higher prices than multiproduct …rms. But then N i 's search behavior could not be justi…ed. If
, then according to Claim 2 multiproduct …rms would charge the monopoly price v since k n 2. But then N b 's search behavior could not be justi…ed.
(iv) It is also impossible that both N b and N i randomize their search behavior. N i would randomize only if multiproduct …rms and single-product …rms supplying product i provide the same expected consumer surplus from purchasing their product i. But then N b would favor visiting a multiproduct …rm.
As a result, either N b or N i randomize in equilibrium. First, consider an equilibrium where N i randomize and N b visit multiproduct …rms. Let X be the probability that N i visit a multiproduct …rm. Then a single-product …rm has
non-shoppers, and a multiproduct …rm has
non-shoppers per product. They must be equal to each other, otherwise using Claim 2 one type of …rm charges higher prices than the other, and then N i 's search behavior could not be justi…ed. Therefore,
which is only positive if < k n . In this case, one can verify that the number of nonshoppers each …rm has at the product level is 1 n . This implies the pro…t outcome. Second, consider an equilibrium where N b randomize and N i visit single-product …rms. Let X be the probability that N b visit a multiproduct …rm. Then a multiproduct …rm has
non-shoppers per product, and a single-product …rm has
nonshoppers. (Notice that those N b who visit single-product …rms will randomly choose one among 2(n k) of them.) Again, they must be equal to each other, otherwise using Claim 2 either multiproduct …rms would charge the monopoly price (which would contradict N b 's search behavior), or single-product …rms would charge higher prices (which would contradict N i 's search behavior). Therefore,
which is only less than 1 if
. In this case, one can verify that the number of non-shoppers each …rm has at the product level is
). This implies the pro…t outcome. 31 Finally, we study the case with k = n 1 such that only one pair of single-product …rms remain in the market. By a similar logic as in the proof of Claim 4, one can show that in this case it is impossible that all non-shoppers (i.e. both N b and N i ) visit multiproduct …rms or single-product …rms, and it is also impossible that all non-shoppers search in a random way. The only di¤erence compared to the case with k n 2 is that now it is possible that N b visit multiproduct …rms and N i visit single-product …rms supplying product i. This is because given there is only one pair of single-product …rms, with this con…guration of non-shoppers'search behavior multiproduct …rms will no longer charge the monopoly price, and so N b 's search behavior can potentially be justi…ed. Therefore we now have three possible types of equilibrium to consider.
Before we proceed, it is useful to …rst study an asymmetric Varian model where each of the …rst n 1 …rms has N A non-shoppers and the last …rm has N B < N A non-shoppers. (This is the case with l = n 1 in Claim 2.) Let F A and F B be the price distributions used by the two types of …rms respectively. F A has a mass point at v, and let be its size. Then the two indi¤erence conditions are:
and p N B + S(1 F A (p)) n 1 = v(N B + S n 1 ) :
From the …rst condition, we can derive the common lower bound of the two price distributions:
Substituting this into the second condition yields
Then the pro…t outcome is 
31 However note that the pricing equilibrium in this case cannot be symmetric. To justify N b 's search behavior, we need an asymmetric pricing equilibrium where multiproduct …rms charge higher prices than single-product …rms. Given k n 2, this is possible according to Claim 3. In this equilibrium each …rm's per product pro…t is
The following result reports the market outcome when k = n 1. (1 ) X + (n 1) 1 v ;
where X 2 ( . Let X be the probability that N i visit a multiproduct …rm. Then we need
From this one can solve X 2 (0; 1) and verify that each …rm has 1 n (1 ) non-shoppers per product. This implies the pro…t result.
(ii) First, consider an equilibrium where N b visit multiproduct …rms and N i visit single-product …rms. In this case, > 1 1 n implies that a multiproduct …rm has more non-shoppers at the product level than a single-product …rm (i.e. 
Then the pro…t outcome (37) is from (35). For N b to randomize, we need
This determines X.
When n = 2, some calculations reveal that (38) holds if and only if . It is then straightforward to check that s (n 1) m (n) (i.e. the last pair of single-product …rms will not choose to merge) if and only if
1+
. This proves result (i) in Proposition 3. Now consider n 3 and prove result (ii) in Proposition 3. Firstly consider 1 1 n . In this case we have characterized pro…ts under every possible market structure, and so using Claims 1, 4, and 5, one can readily verify that the market has dn e multiproduct …rms.
Secondly consider > 1 1 n . Due to the complexity of the price distributions, in general it is di¢ cult to derive conditions under which (38) or (40) hold (although one of them must hold). However as an initial step, we can prove that there will be at least n 1 multiproduct …rms in the market. With > 1 1 n , we must have > k n for 1 k n 2. Then according to Claim 4, when 1 k n 2, each …rm's per product pro…t is m (k) = s (k) = 1 2n k (2 )v. This is increasing in k. Hence it su¢ ces to show that s (n 2) < m (n 1). If the pro…t outcome (36) applies when k = n 1, this condition becomes 1 n + 2 (2 ) < 1 n 1 2 , > 2(n 1) 2n + 1 ;
which is satis…ed because > 1 1 n
. If the pro…t outcome (37) applies when k = n 1, the condition becomes 1 n + 2 (2 ) < X 1 n 1 2 , 2 n + 2 < X n 1 :
32 Notice that given k = n 1 Claim 3 does not apply. So if each multiproduct …rm has the same number of non-shoppers as each single-product …rm, there is no asymmetric pricing equilibrium where multiproduct …rms charge higher prices.
which is satis…ed because from equation (39) we know that X > n 1 n+1 2 . To determine whether the last pair of single-product …rms will merge, we need to compare s (n 1) with m (n). If the pro…t outcome (36) applies, then one can check that s (n 1) < m (n) if and only if < 1+ . If the pro…t outcome (37) applies, we do not have a clear comparison between s (n 1) and m (n), because the X in s (n 1) cannot be explicitly solved from (40). Therefore to make progress, we consider two extreme cases with 1 or 0. When ! 1 (i.e. as the fraction of non-shoppers vanishes) the multiproduct …rm's price distribution F m degenerates around zero. 33 Therefore by continuity for su¢ ciently close to 1 condition (38) must hold. (Notice that to make this argument, we do not need to say anything about the behavior of F s .) Since > 1+ we know (from the previous paragraph) that s (n 1) > m (n) i.e. the last pair of single-product …rms will choose not to merge. When ! 0 (i.e. as the fraction of shoppers vanishes) both …rms'price distributions degenerate at the monopoly price, 34 and so by continuity have most of their mass around v when is su¢ ciently close to zero. Hence it is not clear whether (38) holds or not. If the pro…t outcome (36) applies, we already know that s (n 1) < m (n) for < 1+ . If the pro…t outcome (37) applies, without solving X we can also show s (n 1) < m (n). This is because lim !0 m (n) = v, and in addition 1 1 + X 2 < 2 n + 1 1 2 < 1 n where the …rst inequality uses the fact that X > n 1 n+1 2 (from 39), and the second inequality uses > 1 1 n . Hence by continuity, for su¢ ciently small we have s (n 1) < m (n). Therefore regardless of whether (38) or (40) applies, the last pair of single-product …rms will choose to merge. 33 As ! 1, both N A and N B go to zero in (32) and (34), while S is strictly positive. Then the right-hand side of (32) goes to zero. To sustain (32), we must have F A (p) ! 1 for any p 2 (0; v).
34 As ! 0, S in (33) goes to zero, while for a given , N A is always bounded away from zero. Then (33) implies that p converges to the monopoly price v.
